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We suggest a united concept of consciousness and emotion, based on the sys-
temic cognitive neuroscience perspective regarding organisms as active and goal-
directed. We criticize the idea that consciousness and emotion are psychological 
phenomena having quite different neurophysiological mechanisms. We argue that 
both characterize a unified systemic organization of behavior, but at different lev-
els. All systems act to achieve intended behavioral results in interaction with their 
environment. Differentiation of this interaction increases during individual devel-
opment. Any behavioral act is a simultaneous realization of systems ranking from 
the least to the most differentiated. We argue that consciousness and emotion are 
dynamic systemic characteristics that are prominent at the most and least differ-
entiated systemic levels, correspondingly. These levels are created during develop-
ment. Our theory is based on both theoretical and empirical research and provides 
a solid framework for experimental work.
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1. Introduction
Research on emotions has increased drastically in psychology, psy-
chophysiology and cognitive neuroscience during the last decade. Emo-
tion (E) is regarded to play a crucial role in most psychological pro-
cesses, such as memory, perception and attention (Davidson, Cacioppo, 
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support for the united concept and (6) discuss the concept in relation to 
learning, ontogeny, phylogeny and action performance.
Our united concept of C and E regards organisms as active and goal-
directed. We criticize the idea that C and E are psychological phenomena 
having quite different neurophysiological mechanisms. We argue that C 
and E both characterize a unified systemic organization of behavior, but 
at different levels. All systems act to achieve intended behavioral results 
in interaction with their environment. Differentiation of this interac-
tion increases during individual development. Any behavioral act is a 
simultaneous realization of systems ranking from the least to the most 
differentiated. We argue that C and E are dynamic systemic character-
istics that are prominent at the most and least differentiated systemic 
levels, respectively.
The notion of continuity in our concept means that there are no 
moments in development when C suddenly appears or E suddenly dis-
appears. Each developmental and differentiation level is characterized 
by both C and E. However, the relative amounts of these two character-
istics are different at each level (see Fig. 4). At any given level of devel-
opment, E-characteristics are most prevalent for the least differentiated 
systems, and C-characteristics for the most differentiated ones. Thus, 
E- and C-characteristics are most marked at the opposite ends of the 
systemic continuum.
We prefer to talk about consciousness rather than cognition. There 
are many different definitions for cognition, from simply listing differ-
ent functions and processes (e.g., memory, language processing, prob-
lem solving, thinking) to defining adaptive activities of individuals. We 
define cognition as a process of active interaction with the environment 
that produces knowledge as a means of achieving goals. Or, in a broader 
sense, cognition is an effective action that enables an organism to continue 
to exist in an environment (Maturana, Varela, 1987). To gain knowledge 
means to learn individual acts and cooperative interactions (Maturana, 
1970). Defined as such, cognition is a wider concept than C and E. The 
latter are regarded as specific aspects of cognition. Such a definition has 
similarities with views of, e.g., Schatter (1964), Dehaene (Dehaene, Nac-
cache, 2001) and de Soussa (2003). In addition, a similar paring of C and 
E is reflected in understanding E as an antagonist of rationality (Delgado, 
1966; De Sousa, 2003) and reason (Davidson, 2000; Dolan, 2002) and in 
considering rationality as a distinctive characteristic of C (Block, 1995).
1992; Zajonc, McIntosh, 1992). On the other hand, the nature of the 
consciousness (C) has for years been one of the main theoretical prob-
lems in psychology and neuroscience. Interestingly, after being separated 
for decades, E and C are now clearly finding each other. Many scholars, 
including ourselves, think that they actually form a united concept and 
should be studied together (see, e.g., (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1995; 1999a; 
1999b; Damasio, 1994; 2000; Ellis, 1999; Ellis, Newton, 2000; LeDoux, 
2000; McNaughton, 1997; Panksepp, 2000; Rolls, 1999)). We suggest 
that C and E actually characterize a single entity. In this paper, we dis-
cuss only those aspects of the C and E that are necessary to introduce 
the essence of our concept. The emphasis is on E, while C has been dis-
cussed in more detail earlier (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1999a; 1999b). Before 
going into the details, we first describe our general understanding of the 
relationship between E and C.
Processes and mechanisms of E and C are typically assumed to be 
very different, even polar. Their unity is mostly seen as an interaction 
of two quite separate phenomena in the same machine (for additional 
criticism see (Brushlinskij, 2002; Rubinshtein, 1989)). One important 
reason for such thinking is emphasizing opposing pairs like ‘‘normal’’ 
vs. ‘‘pathological’’ and ‘‘cognitive’’ vs. ‘‘affective’’. Lewin suggested that 
such disjunctive thinking should be replaced by a perspective allowing 
transitional stages and gradual changes (Lewin, 1935). Another reason 
for viewing E and C as separate entities concerns the overestimation 
of the differences between organization levels in organism’s processes. 
Such differences are real, but common systemic principles should also 
be taken into account (Anokhin, P.K., 1973; 1978).
The united concept of C and E, based on the principle of continuity 
(Brushlinskij, 2002; Lewin, 1935) and the theory of functional systems 
(Anokhin, P.K., 1973) has been formulated within the theoretical frame-
work of Fsystemic psychophysiology’ (Alexandrov, Yu.I, 1995; 1999a; 
1999b), a term which is close to systemic cognitive neuroscience (Engel, 
Fries, Singer, 2001; Milner, Squire, Kandel, 1998). This concept takes 
into account common organizational principles valid at all systemic lev-
els but also the cardinal differences between the levels.
In the present article, we will: (1) outline the essence of the united 
concept of C and E, (2) sketch the main theoretical positions of systemic 
cognitive neuroscience, (3) describe the united concept in more details, 
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the systems undergo selective and accelerated maturation, assuring the 
survival of the organism at the early stages of individual development 
(Anokhin, P.K., 1973).
Shvyrkov (1986) suggested that systemogenesis takes place also dur-
ing adult development because the formation of a new behavioral act 
is always a formation of a new system. The principal factor in under-
standing the role of different neurons in the organization of behavior is 
the history of behavioral development, i.e., the history of the successive 
systemogeneses (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1989; Alexandrov and Alexandrov, 
1982). The system-selective concept of learning (Shvyrkov, 1986) is in 
line with the idea of a selective, rather than instructive, principle under-
lying learning (Edelman, 1987). This concept considers the formation of 
a new system to be a fixation of the stage of individual development–the 
formation of a new element of SE during learning.
The neural basis of this process is the specialization of ‘‘reserve’’ 
(silent) neurons, but not a change in specialization of already special-
ized units. New neurons appearing in neoneurogenesis are also likely 
to be involved in this process (Shoers, Miesegaes, Beylin, et al., 2001), 
in which a new system is added to the existing ones (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000; De Sousa, 2003). It does not substitute 
the previously formed systems, but instead is ‘‘superimposed’’ on them. 
Neurophysiological studies have demonstrated that specialization of re-
cently specialized neurons does not change during a single-unit record-
ing lasting for weeks and even months, and that there are many silent 
neurons in different brain areas (Bradley, Burns, et al., 1996; Chang, 
Sawyer, et al., 1994; Jog, Kubota, Connolly, et al., 1999; Swadlow, Hicks, 
1997; Thompson, Best, 1990; Wilson, McNaughton, 1993; Woodward, 
Janak, Chang, 1998).
It has been shown (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999; Alex-
androv Yu.I., Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000; Shvyrkov, 1986) that com-
plex instrumental behavior is realized by a new system that was formed 
during learning of the acts composing this behavior, and by the simulta-
neous realization of older systems (Fig. 1) formed at previous stages of 
individual development (see also Fig. 3). The latter may be involved in 
many behavioral patterns, i.e., they may belong to elements of SE that are 
common for various acts (Fig. 1). Therefore, behavior is the realization 
of the history of behavioral development. Multiple systems, each fixing a 
certain stage of development of the given behavior, are involved.
2. Theoretical background
Reality is both objective and subjective (Midgley, 1994; Searle, 1992). 
We have examined formation and realization of subjective experience 
(SE) in animals and humans with neurophysio-logical methods (Alex-
androv, Yu.I., Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000) and consider E and C as 
important aspects characterizing its dynamics. In order to describe the 
neuronal basis of SE, we first define the elements of SE.
Properties of a brain are not a sum of properties of single neurons 
but instead emerge as a result of dynamic interaction of the neurons 
within a system (Milner, Squire, Kandel, 1998; Mountcastle, 1995). The 
neural equivalent of an element of SE, established during the formation 
of a new behavior and realized in behavior, is defined as an organization 
of a group of neurons composing the system. A well-developed systemic 
approach to the neuronal bases of behavior is based on P. Anokhin’s the-
ory of functional systems (for a review, see (Anokhin, P.K., 1973)). Of 
importance in this theory is the definition of a system-creating factor– 
the result of a system–a desired relation between an organism and envi-
ronment achieved through the realization of that system. The principal 
determinant of a system is not a stimulus, an event in the past, but a 
future result of the behavior. Thus, a system is understood as a dynamic 
organization of activity of components in different anatomical localiza-
tions, both in the brain and in the rest of the body. The interaction of 
components provides an adaptive result for an organism.
The interaction of neurons while achieving a behavioral result is 
accomplished by synchronizing the activity of the neurons in different 
brain structures (Aleksandrov, I.O., Maksimova, 1985). Interestingly, a 
very similar suggestion but related to the ‘‘binding’’ problem was devel-
oped later and has gained considerable experimental support ((Roelf-
sema, Engel, Konig, et al., 1997); see also (Thatcher, 1997)). Synchro-
nization of neurons located in different brain areas has been suggested 
to be important in understanding C (Engel, Fries, KoЁnig, et al., 1999; 
Thompson, Varela, 2001).
Another key concept in the theory of functional systems is develop-
ment. Both concepts, development and results of a system, are merged 
into the concept of systemogenesis. Systemogenesis refers to the idea 
that during early ontogeny those differently localized elements of the 
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This solution of the mind–body problem was formulated about a 
quarter of a century ago. It resembles Hegel’s ‘‘neutral monism’’ (see in 
(Priest, 1991)) arguing that mind and physical are two aspects of united 
reality. Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995, p. 215) formulated a double-aspect 
principle: ‘‘Information (or at least some information) has two basic 
aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect’’. We would replace 
‘‘some information’’ with ‘‘informational systemic processes’’, i.e., pro-
cesses which organize elementary mechanisms into a functional system.
3. Stream of consciousness
Behavior is considered to be active and aimed at a future event–the 
result. A fundamental process is the prediction of the consequences of a 
behavioral (perceptual) act. In the following section, we shall elaborate 
the idea that comparison of the predicted and achieved results is the es-
sence of C. The process of matching the predicted and actual parameters 
of an event has also been considered a basic content of C by others, but 
they were regarding the stimulus as an event (Edelman, 1989; Ivanitsky, 
1995; John, Easton, Isenhart, 1997; Gray, 1995; Grossberg, 1999).
The role of C in behavior is commonly understood in the terms of 
‘‘Cartesian theatre’’. Behavior is considered as a continuum from stimulus 
to response, a special ‘‘perceptive system’’ providing ‘‘input’’ to a central 
thinking arena, which in turn controls systems governing bodily motion 
(Dennett, 1993). It is very difficult to eliminate the Cartesian theatre if 
one sticks to a traditional stimulus– response paradigm (see, e.g., (Pri-
bram, 1999)). However, systemic cognitive neuroscience may be a step 
towards an alternative. In it, the behavioral act is not considered as an 
isolated entity, but as a component of a continuum of behavioral acts. 
The next act is realized after the result of the previous act is achieved and 
evaluated. Evaluation is a necessary part of the organizational processes 
of the next act. It is a transitional process from the realization of one act 
to that of the subsequent act (Fig. 2). In this perspective, behavior is a 
continuum of achieving results (Anokhin, P.K., 1978). Environmental 
changes, traditionally considered to be stimuli for a given act, are infor-
mationally linked with the preceding behavior in the course of which 
these changes were anticipated in the model of future behavioral result–
the goal of behavior. We suggested above that realization of any behav-
ioral act is subserved by a simultaneous activation of many systems of 
Our single-unit recordings during instrumental behavior have dem-
onstrated that neurons with new specializations are abundant in cere-
bral cortex, whereas phylogenetically archaic and peripheral structures 
contain very few such neurons (Alexandrov, Grechenko, Gavrilov, et 
al., 2000). Systems may differ in level, intricacy and quality of a result 
achieved. Neurons participating in a functional system are located in 
different anatomical areas.
The ideas presented above are fundamental for systemic cognitive 
neuroscience, which suggests a systemic solution to the mind–body prob-
lem (Shvyrkov 1978; 1990). In this solution, the organizing of physiologi-
cal processes into a system is based on specific systemic processes. Their 
substrate is physiological activity, whereas their informational content is 
mental. Mental processes that characterize an organism and behavioral 
act as a whole, and physiological processes that take place at the level of 
separate elements cannot be related directly, but only through the infor-
mational systemic processes. Mental events cannot be related directly to 
the localized elementary physiological events, but rather to the systemic 
processes of their organization. Psychological and physiological descrip-
tions are partial descriptions of the same systemic processes. We stress 
that systemic processes involve not only the brain but also the whole body. 
Thus, the term mental characterizes the organization of activity not only 
in neurons but also in other anatomical structures of the organism.
Figure 1. Systemic structure of behavior. Two different behavioral acts consist 
of both old systems which are common to both of them, and of new systems de-
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achieved final result reveals the correspondence between the achieved 
organism–environment relation as a whole and the relation that was 
planned when the behavioral act was formed.
Comparison of the predicted and actual parameters of an event, 
the content of C, occurs constantly during behavior. Organisms do not 
anticipate and match the stimuli, but rather the intermediate and final 
results. Thus, we connect C with evaluation of predicted and achieved 
results at different levels of behavioral organization.
C operates at different levels in individual mind (see also (Damasio, 
2000; Dennett, 1993; Edelman, 2003; Fessard, 1954; Freeman, 1990; 
Granit, 1977; Tulving, 1985; Zeki, 2003; Zelazo, 2004)). Comparison of 
the parameters of intermediate results with the predicted ones during 
the realization of a behavioral act corresponds to the first level of C. 
Transitional processes from one behavioral act to another (comparison 
of the actual and predicted parameters of the final result of the behav-
ioral act) correspond to the second, ‘‘higher’’, level of C. Evaluation of 
intermediate results perhaps takes much less time than that of the fi-
nal result (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, 1979; Jeannerod, 1999; Libet, 
1993, p. 201). C exists in an indefinite range of degrees (Searle, 1990). 
Thus, the two levels of C actually refer to two categories of levels.
Now, we can give a working definition of C. The content and signifi-
cance of C are the evaluation by an organism of its relation to environ-
ment during the realization of a behavioral act (external or internal) and 
during transitional processes between acts. Evaluation depends on con-
tent of individual experience and results in its continual updating. Fig. 2 
helps to conceive the relation of stream of consciousness to the stream of 
systemic organization of the behavioral continuum. There are different 
levels of C that are related to the stream of final results and intermediate 
results. Interestingly, Seche-nov suggested already a century ago that C 
is a chain of links. In a similar vein, Crick and Koch (Crick, Koch, 2003) 
propose that visual C is a ‘‘series of snapshots’’.
4. Consciousness and emotion: similar roles
Vygotsky defines E and C quite similarly in different articles. He sug-
gests that E is an ‘‘evaluative reaction of an organism on its own behavior’’ 
(Vygotsky, 1982, p. 94) and defines C as ‘‘reaction of an organism on its 
own reactions’’ (Vygotsky, 1982, p. 58). This similarity is not accidental.
different ages. Thus, transitional processes between behavioral acts may 
be viewed as stages in which activity in one set of functional systems 
(elements of SE) is replaced by another set.
Two  types  of  neurons  are  active  during  transitional  processes: 
(1) those related to the realization of the preceding and following be-
havioral acts, and (2) additional neurons not related to realization of 
either of these acts (Aleksandrov, I.O., Maksimova, 1985; Alexandrov, 
Yu.I., Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000; Shvyrkov 1978; 1990). During 
‘‘coactivation’’ of neurons, the states of simultaneously active neurons 
belonging to the systems of different acts are coordinated. Activations 
of additional neurons also involve the elements of SE which do not sub-
serve realizations of the preceding and following acts. Transitional pro-
cess is not merely an overlap of the two systemic processes, it is a specific 
systemic process itself.
Transitional processes determine intersystemic relations that are not 
an exact copy of previous behaviors. Reorganization of these relations is 
the most important feature of the transitional process. Transitional sys-
temic processes include (i) evaluation of the achieved result; (ii) organiza-
tion of the next act, depending on evaluation and (iii) reorganization of 
relations among the systems of the just realized act (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
1999a; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999; Shvyrkov 1978; 1990).
Results can be intermediate or final (Fig. 2). Both types of results are 
compared with predicted behavioral outcomes. Comparison of inter-
mediate results is necessary for the appropriate deployment of consecu-
tive phases within a behavioral act. The comparison of the predicted and 
Figure 2. Behavioral continuum as a continuum of results. ir = interme-
diate result, FR = final result of a given behavioral act, Act = behavioral 
act. T refers to transitional processes from a preceding to the following 
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gested that the most general division of behavior is that of approach and 
withdrawal. This division is appropriate to all behavior in all animals 
(Schneirla, 1959). The lowest, the earliest and the most common level 
of differentiation for all living beings is to approach ‘‘good’’ things and 
to withdraw from ‘‘bad’’ things (Dennett, 1993). This basic ‘‘approach- 
withdrawal’’ division of E is widely accepted (see (Davidson, Irwin, 
1999)). We connect E to the most ancient and minimally-differentiat-
ed levels of the organization of behavior (for related views, see (Ano-
khin, P.K., 1978; Berntson, Boysen, Cacioppo, 1993; Cacioppo, Gard-
ner, 1999; Davidson, Cacioppo, 1992; Davidson, Ekman, Friesen, Saron, 
Senulis, 1990; Goldfield, 1995; Panksepp, 2000; Panksepp and Panksepp, 
2000; Schneirla, 1939; 1959; Zajonc, 1980)).
Systems subserving approach and withdrawal behaviors are formed 
during early prenatal life (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999). 
These systems may be considered as early formed elements of SE that 
compose individual memory. Properties of these elements influence the 
features of later formed adult behavior (Gottlieb, 1971; Pedersen, Blass, 
1981). These systems subserve achievement of proper nutrition. A fetus 
may also perform ‘‘defensive’’ actions and move to avoid potentially dam-
aging influences (see (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999)).
If even prenatal acts are directed at the achievement of adaptive 
result, behavior certainly is goal-directed and future-oriented in early 
postnatal infants (Bertenthal, 1996; Goldfield, 1995). After birth, infants 
use prenatally elaborated acts to approach and withdraw (Goldfield, 
1995; Zelazo, 2004).
The ultimate result of most pre- and postnatal behaviors is nutrition. 
Gradually, this behavior becomes more differentiated. In each subsequent 
stage of development, organisms take into account additional environ-
mental details to organize their behavior (see, e.g., in (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
1989; Khayutin, Dmitrieva, Alexandrov, L.I., 1997)). At the prenatal stage, 
various movements may lead to very similar nutritional outcomes (Alex-
androv, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999). Then sucking behavior develops, 
shaped by many factors such as the concurrent activity of siblings. Gradu-
ally, the infant’s food-acquisition behavior starts to depend on different 
food materials as well as on the specific need state of the individual.
It has been suggested that E has its origin in pleasant and unpleas-
ant sensations that the infant and even the fetus experienced (Van der 
Veer, 1996). Some facial expressions of E are innate (Darwin, 1965; Gan-
In addition to its role in the control of an individual’s behavior, C is 
also crucial in communication. C provides for high-level interactions 
with other conscious beings (Frith, 1995). In humans, use of language in 
social interaction is an important ‘‘carrier’’ of C. It is essential in the col-
lective achievement of results (Rubinshtein, 1989; Vanderwolf, 1998). 
‘‘Conscious facts’’ can be shared through communication with others 
(Hilgard, 1980; Simonov, 1994). Using language, individuals can evalu-
ate their own behavior (give a self-report) and also share this evaluation 
with others. Language areas of the brain are involved in the organization 
of behavior even when overt verbalization is not required (Ivanitsky, 
1993; Ivanitsky, 1995; Nishitani, Hari, 2000).
As is generally agreed, E is formed early in ontogeny. We argue that it 
has significance comparable to that of C in the control of activity. How-
ever, the SE involved in this process does not yet contain language-coded 
elements of social experience. This is why E and C appear so different if 
C is considered only with respect to its highest language-dependent self-
reflective role. Also, E may be considered as related to the evaluation of 
correspondence between the program of actions and its actual realiza-
tion ((Reykowskij, 1979), cf. level 1 of C). Like C, E appearing during the 
termination of realization of behavioral acts is related to the compari-
son of predicted and actual parameters of results ((Anokhin, P.K., 1978), 
cf. level 2 of C).
Dynamics of E and C on a behavioral continuum are also similar. 
Both are related to the process of achievement of a result during the re-
alization of action and to the evaluation of achieved results. Their roles 
include control and sustenance of behavior as well as its activation and 
termination (Anokhin, P.K., 1978; Rolls, 1986; 1999; Rubinshtein, 1989; 
Strongman, 1987). Facial expression and nonlinguistic vocalizations re-
lated to E suggest that E also has an important communicative role (Iz-
ard, 1977). Emotion and consciousness at successive stages of individual 
development E and C appear to have similar roles in behavior. Do we 
then actually use the two terms to describe different aspects of a single 
mechanism that is underlying behavior? In an attempt to answer this 
question, we will concentrate on individual development.
Formation of new elements of SE during development results in 
increasing differentiation of organism–environment relations (Alexan-
drov, Yu.I., 1989; Chuprikova, 1997; Edelman, 2003; Tononi, Edelman, 
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chrow, Steiner, Daher, 1983), observed even in prematurely born infants 
(Anokhin, P.K., 1978). We were born with ‘‘the mechanism of primary 
E’’ (Damasio, 1994). Thus, realization of the earliest forms of behavior is 
a sufficient condition for behavior to be emotional.
As Tononi and Edelman (Tononi, Edelman, 1998) noted, systemic 
complexity and differentiation can be used as measures of conscious 
experience. High complexity implies not only local specialization but 
necessarily global integration as well (Tononi, Sporns, Edelman, 1994; 
Tononi, Edelman, 1998). Complexity along with differentiation increases 
during development (Demetrius, 1997; Tononi, Edelman, 1998). From 
our viewpoint, development, and hence this increase in differentation, is 
based on the specialization of neurons in relation to newly formed more 
differentiated systems.
Human abilities to differentiate the environment are practically lim-
itless, since we can use social experience, World III (the world of man-
made culture, comprising the whole of objective knowledge (Popper, 
Eccles, 1977)), to increase the number of elements of SE. This qualita-
tively new, higher level of differentiation leads to a tremendous increase 
in C-characteristics of behavior.
Fig. 3 demonstrates neurons which are specialized in relation to 
systems that were formed at different stages of individual development. 
The trigeminal mesencephalic nucleus starts to function at the earliest 
stage of ontogeny. A majority of the neurons of the anterolateral motor 
cortex (jaw area) become specialized later during the formation of the 
behavioral act of food seizure. The hippocampal neuron is specialized 
at the latest stage of ontogeny during learning of instrumental food-ac-
quisition behavior in the experimental cage. The neuron in the trigemi-
nal mesencephalic nucleus is active during each jaw movement in the 
seizure of the food, grinding and regular mastication. The neuron in 
the anterolateral motor cortex is active in more specific situations: dur-
ing the seizure of food from various sources such as different food-
boxes (near opposite walls of the experimental cage), from the floor 
or from experimenter’s hand. The hippocampal neuron is active in an 
even more specific situation: during the seizure of food from a certain 
food-box and not from the floor or hands. Vertical thin line indicates 
that, during seizure from the appropriate food-box, all these neurons 
belonging to the systems of different age and levels of differentiation 
are active simultaneously.
Figure 3. Recordings from hippocampus were made during instrumental food-
acquisition behavior in which a rabbit acquired food by pressing one of the two 
pedals on left and right sides of the experimental cage. Pedal pressing caused food 
to appear in a feeder on the same side of the cage. The rabbit repeatedly carried out 
the food-acquisition task involving a constant sequence of acts (pedal pressing, 
turning and going to the feeder, taking food from the feeder) on both sides of the 
cage (for details, see (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Jarvilehto, 1989; Alexand- 
rov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1990)). EMG shows activity of m. masseter 
during food seizure and mastication. In actograms, upward deflection means 
pressing the pedal and downward deflection means lowering of the head into the 
feeder. The hippocampal neuron was active in the right-wall (in figure on the left) 
but not in the left-wall cycle. The motor cortex neuron was active during both 
right-wall and left-wall cycles in the same instrumental food-acquisition behav-
ior, but also when the animal received food from the experimenter’s hand and 
took it from the floor. Neuron in the trigeminal mesencephalic nucleus (TMN) 
was active during seizure and mastication of food. Jaw movement actogram shows 
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perspective), it means a basic classification of things and events as good 
or bad (Damasio, 1994). This is a coarse nonlinguistic description and is 
used for the self-report about the results of actions already at the earliest 
stages of ontogeny. This is why we often cannot verbalize the reasons for 
our attraction or repulsion to things and events (Zajonc, 1980). Thus, even 
though E is related to the individual’s self-evaluation of behavior and its re-
sults just like C, it is its relation to the results of those systems that ensures 
the individual’s relation to the environment at a low level of discretization.
The C-characteristic of behavior is related to which new systems are 
actualized out of the many different possibilities existing in individual’s 
memory (the third-person perspective). Haggard et al. (Haggard, Clark, 
Kalogeras, 2002) have shown evidence of ‘‘binding’’ of awareness of the 
voluntary action and its effect, attracted together across time. In terms 
of our concept, it means that matching of intermediate and final results 
form a unit for the subject (the first-person perspective). What we have 
described are not two different first-person perspectives (E and C), but 
rather two aspects of the same perspective.
The two meanings of E may cause confusion: (1) E as a characteristic 
of low-differentiated evolutionary and onto-genetically old systems and 
(2) E as a characteristic of highly differentiated systems that are formed 
in a cultural context using language and thought and based on social 
feedback. Verbal description of subjects’ relation with their environ-
ment uses World III terms (Popper, Eccles, 1977) and includes classifi-
cation of the current relation using culturally understood concepts (e.g., 
‘‘fear’’, ‘‘pleasure’’) if the intensity of the E-characteristic (see below) is 
high enough. Social feedback is used in ‘‘emotional education’’, when an 
individual learns to understand his or her own subjective feelings and 
desires, and to cope with them (Buck, 1989). The subjective experience 
of E, ‘‘how each emotion feels’’ (Ekman, 1999a) is a ‘‘mixture’’ of rough 
global and discrete cultural World III descriptions. Recent experiments 
have shown the involvement of the evolutionarily newest ‘‘C-related’’ cor-
tical structures in ‘‘emotional behavior’’. The prefrontal cortex, connected 
to conscious processes and specific human cognitive abilities (Quartz, 
1999), is regarded also as an important area for emotional behavior (Da-
vidson, Irwin, 1999; Rolls, 1999). This brain area may play an important 
role in the aforementioned mixing of descriptions.
While Fig. 2 illustrated the dynamics of SE during behavior, Fig. 4 il-
lustrates its systemic structure based on the basic and ontogenetically old 
The structure of SE becomes more complex due to both the increase 
in the number of elements of SE and of the interactions among them. As 
a result, the behavioral repertoire becomes larger. However, this diver-
sity can be classified into two groups, approach and avoidance, since the 
repertoire being formed is constructed using ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ classifica-
tion resulting from a basic set of values that each individual possesses 
(Damasio, 1994).
Early forms of food-acquisition behavior are examples of evolution-
ary-fixed approach acts in the positive E domain (E+). An early evolving 
avoidance ‘‘freezing’’ behavior is an example of the negative E domain 
(E–). Later, many other goal-directed withdrawal behaviors, with spe-
cific emotional feelings, evolve. For example, withdrawal from feces and 
carrion and the accompanying subjective feeling of disgust are adaptive 
(Efroimson, 1995). The same object may be related to opposite E in dif-
ferent organisms: hyenas approach carrion.
6. United concept of consciousness and emotion
As stated earlier, performance of a behavioral act is subserved by 
the simultaneous realization of systems corresponding to both minimal 
and maximal levels of differentiation. Later evolving forms of mental life 
do not annihilate early ‘‘primitive’’ ones (see also (Ribot, 1901; Werner, 
1948)). Rather, C and E may be considered as characteristics of differ-
ent levels of systemic organization of the given behavioral act that cor-
respond to different levels of the environment’s differentiation. Each of 
these levels is a transformed stage of individual development fixed in 
memory as systems that were formed during learning. It is impossible 
to define when C appears. At each successive stage, as differentiation of 
systems grows, C-characteristics increase. C and E are linked charac-
teristics of the same whole systemic organization. Each developmental 
and differentiation level is necessarily characterized by both C and E. 
Consequently, any change to this organization will cause some changes 
in both C and E. However, C- and E-characteristics are not equal for all 
systems; they are maximally prominent at the most and least differenti-
ated systemic levels, respectively.
E-characteristic of behavior is related to which domains of individual 
experience are actualized: approach (E+) or withdrawal (E–) (from the 
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ideas. After that, we will emphasize the aspects of this approach which 
we think are original to us.
7.1. Similarities
McDougall (McDougall, 1938) considered the search for food and 
avoidance of harmful events as two primary ‘‘strivings’’. All other striv-
ings subsequently develop from these primitive forms by differentia-
tion. Ortony et al. (Ortony, Clore, Collins, 1988) also regarded positive 
and negative as two basic and minimally differentiated types of affective 
responses, forming a basis for further increasing differentiation. They 
considered these types as minimally differentiated forms of E, and their 
further development as reflecting increasing differentiation.
In our view, the prenatally-formed oldest systems are connected in 
memory with slightly younger systems inside the approach and with-
drawal domains. Rather similarly, Lang et al. (Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 
1990) argue that E space is organized according to a basic appetitive–
defensive dimension. They criticize the view that there are several inde-
pendent basic emotions–disgust, fear, anger, joy, sadness, surprise–and 
propose that their specificity is Ftactical (specific context-bound patterns 
of action), not Fstrategical (defined by broad end goals). Liotti et al. (Li-
otti, Brannan, Egan, et al., 2001) also developed ideas about the common 
origin of different Es and have presented experimental evidence in sup-
port of a common brain mechanisms for primary emotions.
Behavior  of  postnatal  infants  is  not  highly  differentiated  (see  in 
(Fraisse, Piaget, 1963)). Early-formed systems provided a neural basis to 
what Koffka (1921) called ‘‘emotion-like perceptions’’ that are basic for 
the subsequent development of C. Krueger (Krueger, 1930) suggests that 
separate perceptions, ideas, volitional acts, all originate from diffuse emo-
tional states. Zajonc (1980) concluded that ‘‘good–bad’’ is the first and 
most basic discrimination that an individual learns in ontogeny. In nor-
mal behavior, learning to ‘‘discriminate’’ means establishing specific goal-
directed approach and withdrawal behaviors. This approach–withdrawal 
dichotomy is clearly observable in newborn infants (Goldfield, 1995).
Importantly,  this  dichotomy  exists  throughout  ontogeny.  Highly 
differentiated systems can be divided according to this basic dichoto-
my. All conscious states, as Searle (2000) claims, come to us from the 
pleasure–unpleasure dimension. Berntson et al. (Berntson, Boysen, Ca-
cioppo, 1993) also hold that the basic evaluative dimension (approach–
approach-withdrawal division. The two old systems (black E– and white 
E+) are connected in memory with other old withdrawal or approach 
systems. They are more differentiated than the oldest ones but a mass of 
even more differentiated systems has formed after them. Because of this 
systemic differentiation, we have a continuum of fine-grained emotional 
states, not just two.
Fig. 4 shows the E+ and E– domains as conceptually similar. However, 
experimental results indicate that withdrawal behavior is more demand-
ing with respect to environmental cues than approach behavior (Ale-
xandrov and Alexandrov, 1993; Khayutin, Dmitrieva, Alexandrov, L.I., 
1997). This suggests that E– is more differentiated than E+ (Damasio, 
1994). Larger diversity of E– means more possibilities to act. In this sense, 
we are ‘‘more conscious’’ when experiencing negative emotions.
7. Similarities and differences between  
our and other approaches
Our theoretical background and united concept of C and E differ 
in many respects from more traditional thinking. To clarify our con-
ceptualization, we first review literatures sharing at least some of our 
Figure 4. Consciousness and emotion at successive stages of differentiation. 
At the bottom, the two big ovals symbolize the earliest low-differentiated sys-
tems subserving the first forms of behavior: approach (white) and withdrawal 
(black). Differentiation increases upwards. Lines delineate the sets of systems 
of different ages. The simultaneous realization of these systems subserves 
achieving results of different behavioral acts. Triangles illustrate the view that 
emotion and consciousness are characteristics of an integrated multilevel sys-
temic organization of behavior; they also illustrate that the levels of differen-
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per, Eccles, 1977). The use of World III terms (words, ideas, etc.) means 
that while evaluating the results of own behavior, a human being looks 
at himself ‘‘through the eyes of society’’. Therefore, human culture influ-
ences C, but also has an impact on E.
In the course of the differentiation of behavior, the number of be-
havioral acts shared by different emotions might increase. Outwardly 
similar actions may be used both to approach and to withdraw. Such 
‘‘common acts’’ are marked in Fig. 4 as the overlapping of the E+ and 
E– systems. The emotional palette of behavior may therefore be very di-
verse due to the connections in the structure of memory between these 
systems representing different E domains. This complexity is the reason 
why we have so-called mixed states (Plutchik, 1962).
We agree with Damasio that ‘‘innate circuits’’ (old low-differentiated 
systems) participate not just in bodily regulation but also in the activity 
of the evolutionarily modern adult brain areas (Damasio, 1994). Since 
the subserving of any behavior necessarily involves early maturing sys-
tems, E of certain intensity is an intrinsic characteristic of all behaviors. 
This is in agreement with Buck’s (1989) statement that we always feel 
hunger and thirst, happiness and anger, etc., but often weakly which 
causes us to ignore the feelings. It is also consistent with Zajonc’s (1980) 
view that feeling accom-panies all cognition. Damasio’s (2000) view 
also presupposes this obligatoriness, and even the continuous presence 
of E (‘‘background’’) in any behavior, but this E is not necessarily felt. 
He considers E as ‘‘scaffolding’’ which has arisen during development 
and which servers as the foundation for conscious, cognitive processing 
(Damasio, 1994). Ellis and Newton (Ellis, Newton, 2000) also think that 
E underlies all conscious states.
Since any behavior is a simultaneous realization of both low and 
highly differentiated systems, the first-person perspective at any given 
moment includes C- and E-characteristics. It means that E contributes 
to the phenomenal C and vice versa. This proposition agrees with Ellis’s 
(1999) opinion that E penetrates phenomenal C and is thus inseparable 
from the latter.
We agree with Damasio (1994; 2000) that treating C and E as sepa-
rate localizable entities is a mistake. This error in conceptualization is 
widespread because it fits well with the traditional Cartesian paradigm 
that is the foundation for the thinking of many researchers (Dennett, 
1993). Our concept does not follow the Cartesian paradigm and sug-
withdrawal) is not peculiar to the specific neuraxial level and may be 
characteristic of all levels in the neuronal subserving of behavior.
How is it in phylogeny? Do we agree that E is the maternal basis for 
all other mental events (Krueger, 1930), that affect is primary in phy-
logeny (Zajonc, 1980), that E was set in evolution before the appear-
ance of C (Damasio, 2000) and that C is evolutionarily based on primal 
emotions (Liotti, Brannan, et al., 2001)? No, because in our perspective, 
there was never a moment in evolution when E-characteristics existed 
without C-characteristics. Yes, because lower species, e.g., snails, are 
more Faffective than humans. Humans have much more differentiated 
systems and much longer ‘‘distance’’ between old and the newest sys-
tems. The ratio of new/old systems is high in humans, and this is why we 
are more conscious than other organisms.
C does not came to humans ‘‘as a sudden illumination’’ (Eccles, 
1992, p. 7320; Edelman, 2003). Clifford (1874; 1886) wrote more than a 
century ago that if we accept evolution, we also have to accept that even 
in the lowest organism such as amoeba there is something of a shared 
nature with our own C.
In any individual, it is possible to select the systems corresponding 
to the different levels of environment’s differentiation, from minimal (E) 
to maximal (C). By definition, this division is valid for all organisms that 
have individual development because development means formation of 
more differentiated systems. Therefore, we agree with Buck (Buck, 1989) 
that not only complex, but also even simple organisms have E and also 
‘‘intelligence’’ (Trewavas, 2003). When a fish gets on a hook, it does not 
merely show bodily manifestations of negative emotions (Randerson, 
2003), but actually experiences them (Sneddon, Braithwaite, Gentle, 2003; 
Randerson, 2003). If a snail self-stimulates its mesocerebrum, this means 
that it likes the effect of stimulation and realizes approach behavior with 
E+ characteristic. Then, as suggested by the authors, the mesocerebrum 
has an ‘emotional’ role in behavior (Balaban, Maksimova, 1993).
Evaluation of an action’s results is present in all animals and may 
be related to proto-C and proto-E. The content of SE involved in these 
processes differs from that in humans. Animals use only their own ex-
perience of relations with their environment or in rare occasions the 
experience of individuals they have had a direct contact with (White-
head, 1998; Whiten, Goodall, McGrew, et al., 1999). Humans use, in ad-
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activity or an aspect of organization of biosystems that represent diverse 
aspects of experience but not a separate mechanism or a ‘‘product’’ of a 
certain neuronal circuitry (Deikman, 1973; Kinsbourne, 1995; Neisser, 
1976; Thompson, Varela, 2001).
Vanderwolf et al. (Vanderwolf, Kelly, et al., 1988, p. 46, 56) wrote: 
‘‘…it is doubtful that ‘‘emotion’’ is valid category of cerebral function. 
There is little scientific basis for the common belief that folk psychol-
ogy concepts such as ‘‘emotion’’ or ‘‘motivation’’ actually correspond 
to  natural  anatomical  and  functional  entities  in  the  brain.  Conse-
quently, traditional psychological concepts may often provide mis-
leading guides for the investigation of the control of behavior by the 
brain. Recent... findings suggest that functional studies of the ‘‘limbic 
system’’ must deal with behavior... and that one should not assume, 
a priori, that traditional philosophical and psychological categories 
of the mind have any sort of unified representation in the brain’’. We 
agree with this view. However, we strongly argue that both E and C 
are useful concepts. They indeed originate from folk psychology, in 
which mental processes and states have common-sense, not precise 
definitions (Churchland, 1986) and may be considered as ‘‘cultural 
constructions’’ (p. 56). These concepts are used in everyday life to ex-
plain and predict behavior and in most practical situations they work 
well (Midgley, 1994). However, they influence ‘‘the science proper’’ as 
well. For instance, when the plan is to study neuronal mechanisms of 
E, it is assumed that if the concept of ‘‘emotion’’ exists, it must have a 
special physiological mechanism.
We can attribute to both E and C what Schouten (1999) said about 
C. Although it may be that C does not have ‘‘natural-kind status’’, it is 
impossible to deny the existence of C or claim that the common sense 
concept of C has nothing to do with anything real. Concepts of E and C 
have been used fruitfully across centuries of philosophical, psychologi-
cal and physiological inquiry. They are useful in understanding behav-
ior both from the first- and the third-person perspectives, as well as in 
revealing the relations between these views.
7.2. Differences
The following paragraphs concentrate on those features in our con-
ceptualization that we think to be the most original and unique to us. 
Some of these ideas might have been proposed also by others, but we 
gests that C and E be studied not as separate entities but as E- and C-
character-istics, each applicable to all systems composing behavior. Our 
postulate of the whole-organism nature of these systems is in line with 
the statement that C cannot be identified with a fixed set of brain areas 
(Dehaene, Naccache, 2001). Davidson (2000) also claims that it is im-
possible to define special brain areas dedicated to E and C.
Agreeing with Rolls (1999), we do not think that there exists a spe-
cial additional mechanism of the somatic marker’s evaluation as intro-
duced by Damasio (1994; 2000). However, we disagree with Roll’s argu-
ment that ‘‘visual’’ behavior does not demand activity in somatosensory 
cortex. It certainly does. Moreover, we think that Searle (2000) is right 
in saying that he does not believe we will find visual C in the visual 
system or auditory C in auditory one. Rather, we will find single, ‘‘uni-
fied conscious field’’ containing different aspects of C. If a unisensory 
stimulus (visual or auditory) is behaviorally significant, its presentation 
leads to the simultaneous activation of neurons in numerous brain areas 
(e.g., in both the visual and somatosensory cortex during visual stimu-
lation (Aleksandrov, Maksimova, 1985; Olds, Disterhoft, Segal, 1972)). 
The body and somatosensory ‘‘system’’ are involved in organization of 
any kind of behavior, even in the imagination of behavior (Jeannerod, 
1999).
We argued that the E-characteristic is related to the global division 
of behavior while the C-characteristic is related to the selection from 
a huge repertoire of situationally and individually specific systems of 
behavioral acts. As Zajonc (1980) puts it, we may verbalize or think of 
something in an infinite variety of ways, but we have only a handful of 
emotions.
We related appearance of the E-characteristic with the formation 
of the oldest systems in ontogeny that are directed to the achievement 
of basic metabolic results. This is in an agreement with Panksepp’s idea 
(Panksepp, 2000) that ‘‘neurobiological systems’’ mediating E subserve 
behaviors needed to cope with survival needs and allow newborn or-
ganisms to deal with values.
We argue that C and E are characteristics of the same whole system-
ic organization. With respect to C, others have presented similar opin-
ions (Dennett, 1993). Ellis (1999) considers C as one aspect of a self-
organizing system including the whole brain and the whole organism. 
In a similar vein, some colleagues have suggested that C is an aspect of 162 Yuri I. Alexandrov, Mikko E. Sams Emotion and Consciousness: Ends of a Continuum 163
scription of the specialization of the neurons in that structure belonging 
to low- or high-differentiated systems.
The future-directed nature of C and E is not an additional char-
acteristic of the system that may appear in behavior. It is an intrinsic 
characteristic of the organization of an individual at all levels: from 
behavior to single unit activity (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1999a) and from 
the ancient, prenatally formed systems to the maximally differentiated 
systems which are formed in relation with complex elements of social 
experience.
The content of C is related not to the analysis of stimuli or ‘‘sen-
sorimotor coupling’’ as usually thought (see, however (Jordan, 1998; 
Vandervert, 1995)), but through constructing models of results of both 
overt and covert behavior which are then compared to these models 
with actually achieved results. An important aspect of our concept is 
that the dynamics of behavior is described as successive achievement of 
intermediate and final results composing a behavioral continuum. This 
succession makes it easier to understand the continuous nature of C.
The suggested concept is applied to processes occurring at different 
time scales: phylogenesis, individual development, learning a behavioral 
act and the realization of a behavioral act. It stresses the similarity of C 
and E as characteristics of isomorphous systems with a similar architec-
ture. C and E are not entities, neither independent nor complementary. 
Rather, they are different characteristics of a single entity–the set of sys-
tems that are actualized in the given behavior.
E does not influence or activate C. Neither do E and C interact, be-
cause two different characteristics of the same entity cannot influence 
each other. There is no behavior lacking emotional basis, since any ac-
tualized set of systems is based on low-differentiated systems. It is not 
appropriate to speak about specific systems or mechanisms producing 
C and E, since all systems are aimed at achieving less or more differen-
tiated results. C and E are characteristics that are inherent to various 
systems composing the set to differing extents.
Our conceptualization does not use the ‘‘spotlight metaphor’’ tightly 
linked with the ‘‘Cartesian theatre’’, a metaphor which is a characteris-
tic of the majority of theories of C even when not mentioned explicitly 
(Shanon, 2001). Our concept avoids this metaphor because we treat C 
and E not as products of activity of isolated structures but as character-
istics related with the whole-organism integration.
believe our contribution is combining them into a consistent theoretical 
framework. The systemic approach and emphasis on the activeness of 
organisms are increasingly popular in attempts to construct a concept of 
C and E (Ellis, 1999; Ellis, Newton, 2000; Freeman, 1997; Jordan, 1998; 
Thompson, Varela, 2001; Vandervert, 1998). We base our conceptualiza-
tion on theoretical and experimental research of the systemic organiza-
tion of behavior made during the last 70 years (see (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Brushlinskij, 1999; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000; 
Anokhin, P.K., 1973; Shvyrkov 1978; 1990)). We argue that our theoreti-
cal background is the most consistent and the least eclectic in modern 
systemic neuroscience. It avoids concepts derived from the Cartesian 
paradigm. It argues that behavior is determined by the result of ac-
tion, not by a stimulus. Furthermore, it argues that behavior should not 
be explained by a succession of neural activity from sensory to motor 
structures. Rather, realization of behavior is based on developing suc-
cessive systemic processes, each of these processes being subserved by 
whole-brain integration.
A key concept is a result that is not a new state of an organism or 
a new state of environment but a new organism–environment relation 
that can be objectively described and defined in time. The achievement 
of the result can be experimentally related with the activity of a whole 
organism as well as also with the activity of its neuronal elements (Alex-
androv, Yu.I., 1989; 1999a; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999; 
Alexandrov,  Yu.I.,  Grechenko,  Gavrilov,  et  al.,  2000;  Anokhin,  P.K., 
1973; Shvyrkov, 1986; 1978; 1990). That is why within our conceptual 
framework, single-unit neurophysi-ology may be used to describe the 
dynamics of C and E as characteristics of an organism–environment re-
lation as a whole as effectively as is done in cognitive neuroscience using 
noninvasive methods like EEG, MEG and fMRI (O’Regan, NoeЁ, 2001; 
Thompson, Varela, 2001).
Understanding functions as functional systems that cannot be local-
ized in separate brain structures and that include the whole organism 
avoids ‘‘boxology’’ and the corresponding view that C and E are separate 
localizable entities or independent modules–concepts criticized also by 
others (Damasio, 1994; 2000; Ellis, Newton, 2000; Thompson, Varela, 
2001). It helps in avoiding ‘‘boxology’’ both on the theoretical level and 
in interpreting experimental data. Dynamics of the activity of any given 
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others do so only during withdrawal (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grechenko, 
Gavrilov, et al., 2000; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Bodunov, et al., 
2000; Gavrilov, Grinchenko, Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1998; Hutchison, Davis, 
Lozano, et al., 1999; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, et al., 2004; Shima, 
Aya, Mushiake, et al., 1991). Mapping studies suggest that the human 
cingulate areas are involved in both emotional (positive or negative) 
and cognitive tasks, and hence are involved in both E and C (see, e.g., 
(Bush, Luu, Posner, 2000; Damasio, 2000)). Our interpretation of these 
data is that the cingulate cortex contains separate neuron populations 
with different specializations. For a similar reason (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1993), the hippocampus has been suggested 
to be involved in both ‘‘cognitive and emotional processes’’ (McNaugh-
ton, 1997).
Existence of brain structures that are strongly related to realization 
of, for example, low-differentiated systems and that demonstrate the re-
lation with E-characteristic of behavior does not mean that these struc-
tures ‘‘produce’’ E. E-characteristics do not disappear in more differenti-
ated systems, and cannot be related exclusively to one system or group 
of systems. It just is more marked in low-differentiated systems (Fig. 4). 
It characterizes a whole-organism systemic integration. Finally, cells be-
longing to low-differentiated systems are found, in different amounts, in 
numerous brain structures (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1989; Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1991; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Lauk-
ka, et al., 1993; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grechenko, Gavrilov, et al., 2000; Sh-
vyrkov, 1986).
Experimental data indicate that all neurons do not act as selectively 
as described above. Often, the same neurons are activated in widely dif-
ferent behaviors, e.g., both in approach and withdrawal. While some 
new systems develop as elements of the E– or E+ memory domain (sub-
serving realization of only withdrawal or approach), others subserve 
behavioral acts that may be used in both behaviors (white and black 
overlapping in Fig. 4). Realization of such ‘‘common’’ acts creates an im-
pression that the same act would be used in different emotional situa-
tions, but the acts only look similar. When a monkey uses the same bar 
pressing to avoid a shock and to obtain a reward, different sets of ‘bar-
pressing units’ are active in the cingulate cortex. Some neurons are ac-
tive only if monkey performs bar pressing during approach, others only 
during withdrawal, and the rest during both acts (Nishijo, Yamamoto, 
8. Explanatory and predicting  
capability of the concept
There is considerable evidence of specialized brain structures for 
negative and positive emotions (Cacioppo, Gardner, 1999; Davidson, 
Ekman, Friesen, et al., 1990; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, et al., 2001). 
This is in line with observations showing that neurons with similar 
specialization are often located close to each other (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Grinchenko,  Jarvilehto,  1989;  Hampson,  Simeral,  Deadwyler,  1999), 
and that while some structures contain many neurons belonging to a 
given system, in others there are just a few of them (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
1989; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1991; Alexandrov, 
Yu.I., Brushlinskij, et al., 1999). We suggest that the existence of struc-
tures strongly related to positive or negative emotions means that many 
neurons of this structure belong to relatively low-differentiated systems 
aimed at approach or withdrawal. In other words, E– and E+ reflect dif-
ferent sets of actualized systems (see Fig. 4).
In addition to the brain, different sets refer also to other elements of 
body. Body parts, many of which mature at the earliest stage of ontog-
eny, belong to the low-differentiated system. Therefore, the organiza-
tion of activity of these elements, as well as that of autonomous nervous 
system (ANS) differs in different emotions. Different sets of muscles 
are involved in behavior with different emotional valences (Tassinary, 
Cacioppo, 1992). Moreover, ANS activity is different not only during 
E+ and E– but also during negative emotions such as fear and disgust 
(Ekman, 1984; 1999a). Since E-characteristics are related to the real-
ization of old, low-differentiated systems (formed during early ontog-
eny and persisting during the whole life of an individual), all of these 
differences are present in both young and old organisms (Levenson, 
1992). However, in certain anatomical structures, there are subpopula-
tions of neurons with very different specializations. Some belong to old 
systems of approach and withdrawal behaviors, others to the newest 
systems. For example, in the accessory olfactory bulb of rabbits, some 
neurons are selectively active during withdrawal and others during ap-
proach (Kumar, Dudley, Moss, 1999). Some neurons in both the ante-
rior and posterior cingulate cortex of rabbits, rats and monkeys belong 
to the old systems, but some are specialized to the newest ones. Some 
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tion  (Fig.  4).  This  makes  the  search  for  the  required  material  from 
memory easier and limits the domain used for the operation, and helps 
our reasoning process to operate efficiently (Damasio, 2000). Addition-
ally, E also operates as a basic decision making mechanism without 
the involvement of reason (Damasio, 1998). For example, when visual 
perception is impaired because of massive lesions in the striate cortex 
(blindsight), one can be ‘‘led by emotions’’ to recognize facial expression 
without awareness (De Gelder, 2000).
Animals approach or avoid rough imitations of natural objects. For 
example, appearance of a red oblong object mimicking the red abdomen 
of a concurrent male provokes fighting behavior in sticklebacks dur-
ing spawning season. Systems that subserve such behaviors are species 
specific and phylogenetically fixed, formed early in ontogeny, low dif-
ferentiated and may be actualized by presentation of ‘‘preferanda’’. Indi-
vidual development goes from global ‘‘preferanda’’ to detailed ‘‘discrimi-
nanda’’. On the other hand, the earlier developmental stages of behavior 
are characterized by greater emotionality. Indeed, there is a shift during 
ontogeny from perceiving objects in terms of holistic, overall aspects to 
decomposing objects into separate dimensions (Goldstone, 1998). The 
younger an individual is, the more emotional it is (Fraisse, Piaget, 1963; 
Panksepp, 1994b).
E is a characteristic of systems aimed at the certain adaptive result of 
behavior. When we speak about E at early ontogenetic stages, we assume 
that a given E-characteristic must appear in individual development to-
gether with a specific behavior into which corresponding low-differen-
tiated systems are included. Infants who do not move around are not 
afraid of heights. When they start to move, their wariness of high places 
appears (Bertenthal, 1996; Campos, Bertenthal, Kermoian, 1992).
Relation of E to the formation of behavioral systems means that dif-
ferences in behavior of different species imply differences in E-charac-
teristics of their behavior. At the same time, there is a continuity of emo-
tional expressions from lower animals to humans (Darwin, 1965). Some 
emotional expressions are similar in different species (Ekman, 1999b). 
The similarities exist even though the set of early behavioral acts in ani-
mals belonging to different species differs significantly. Some old pat-
terns in the organization of the nervous system appear in present spe-
cies with minor modifications (Krubitzer, 1995). Communication using 
emotional expressions characterizes the earliest-formed systems, and its 
Ono, et al., 1997). Different neurons in the monkey cingulate cortex are 
active during the same act when it is performed to avoid pain or to ob-
tain a reward (Koyama, Kato, et al., 2001). This means that outwardly 
similar acts are represented by different, yet somewhat overlapping, sets 
of old and new systems. Thus, we can explain results showing that an ap-
parently identical action that is included in different activities can have 
opposite emotional valences (Leont’ev, 1971).
Earlier we discussed the overlap of new systems that are formed 
while learning instrumental acts. However, different behaviors that be-
long to E+ or E– domains partly overlap at the level of the oldest systems 
(see also Fig. 4). In other words, different behavioral acts within a given 
domain may be based on one and the same low-differentiated system. 
Indeed some functional similarity seems to exist also between differ-
ent needs. For example, food-acquisition behavior may be activated in 
thirsty animal when water is inaccessible (Fraisse, Piaget, 1963). Systems 
that are formed in prenatal ontogeny seem to ensure the achievement of 
metabolic results of a fetus, ensuring sucking (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Brush-
linskij, et al., 1999; Pedersen, Blass, 1981). Such a common system later 
differentiated into feeding and drinking.
Zajonc (1980) proposed the existence of ‘‘preferanda’’ for such glob-
al features of environment that allow quick classification of the affective 
character. It is assumed that the amygdala is involved in the unconscious 
use of behaviorally relevant emotional features while cortical structures 
are responsible for the conscious usage of environmental details (Mor-
ris, OЁ hman, Dolan, 1999; Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, et al., 1998). There 
also is evidence that evaluation of a situation starts from global mean-
ing and ends with conscious identification (McCauley, Parmelee, et al., 
1980). Ekman (1984) suggests that there are universal situations, com-
mon to different cultures, that act as elicitors of emotions. For us, global 
and common to different cultures means related to archaic low-differen-
tiated systems with pronounced E-characteristic. The number of these 
systems is small if we compare it with that of the high differentiated 
systems (Fig. 4). It is easy to select behavior of this small set and, conse-
quently, E is in the beginning of action and many elicitors can give rise 
to E nearly immediately (automatic appraisal). Selection from a small 
set means also little information.
However, selection at the low level of differentiation is important. 
It outlines a domain of memory that may be used in the given situa-168 Yuri I. Alexandrov, Mikko E. Sams Emotion and Consciousness: Ends of a Continuum 169
hypotheses and test them experimentally. We analyze the brain mecha-
nisms underlying intensity of E. E has two dimensions: affective valence 
and intensity (Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 1990). Valence was extensively 
discussed above. We suggest that the most important factor influencing 
the intensity of E is the relative proportions of low- vs. high-differentiat-
ed systems activated during a given behavior. The higher the proportion 
of low differentiated systems, the higher is the intensity of E. We hypoth-
esize that suppression of elements belonging to the highly differentiated 
systems leads to an increase of E-characteristic. Experimental refutation 
of this hypothesis would be considered as inconsistent with a funda-
mental premise of our concept.
A shift in relative weight of two sets of systems can be experimen-
tally induced by acute ethanol administration. Acute ethanol injection 
(1 g/kg) decreases number of active neurons in the cingulate cortex. The 
number decreases because of selective suppression of neurons belong-
ing to the newest systems (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 
1990). We observed an analogous tendency in an EEG experiment with 
human subjects. We recorded ERPs while the subjects categorized words 
spoken in a foreign and native language. Acute ethanol administration 
(1 ml/kg) affected significantly more the ERPs elicited by words spoken 
in a foreign language (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Sams, Lavikainen, et al., 1998). 
All subjects became euphoric during the experiment and felt that classi-
fication task was easier after drinking. Nevertheless, the number of clas-
sification mistakes increased. These results can be explained by assum-
ing that alcohol has a selective suppressive influence on those neurons 
that subserve the actualization of experience accumulated at later stages 
of individual development. Their suppression means that the propor-
tion of low-differentiated systems increases. This fits well with subjects’ 
increased emotionality. We have also shown that alcohol intoxication is 
reflected in psychological test performance. When the subjects had the 
same dose of alcohol as in the above-described EEG experiment, their 
emotionality again increased significantly (Bodunov, Bezdenezhnych, 
Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1997).
Supporting  our  findings  that  alcohol  selectively  blocks  neurons 
belonging to the most differentiated systems, Curran and Hildebrandt 
(Curran, Hildebrandt, 1999) showed that alcohol significantly weakens 
conscious but not unconscious recognition. Tiihonen et al. (Tiihonen, 
Kuikka, Kupila, et al., 1994) used positron emission tomography to study 
many aspects are innate (Plutchik, 1991). Behavior of different species 
is based on similar systems that are formed prenatally or at early post-
natal stages (see above). Thus, a basic continuity of emotional expres-
sions may be due to interspecies similarities in the realization of systems 
formed at the earliest stages of individual development.
These systems are actualized together with more differentiated ones 
and are connected with them. Facial expression is a characteristic of re-
alization of older systems. However, subjective description of the emo-
tional state, as a result of emotional education, belongs to higher levels 
of systemic differentiation. Expression and description appear together 
because they are characteristics of the same unity: simultaneously ac-
tive older and newer systems during a behavioral act. Because systems 
of higher differentiation were formed under cultural influence and be-
cause older and newer systems must be coordinated, it is reasonable to 
expect interspecies similarities along with intraspecies differences. These 
differences result from variations of environment where an individual 
developed, e.g., from cultural differences. As an example, culture influ-
ences facial expressions (Ekman, 1984; 1999). Thus, E does not reflect 
only biology, but also depends on social and cultural influences.
The influence of cultural factors is manifested in use of language 
to describe our relation with environment. Such description may also 
use terms belonging to different emotions. Damasio (2000) notes that 
C may be considered as both a feeling of emotions and as a usage of 
language for the translation from the nonverbal language of body. This 
‘‘translation’’ of individuals’ actions results into the language of society 
which takes place at the border between neighboring acts on a behavior-
al continuum. This translation occurs during transitional processes and 
is included in the content of a second level of C (see Fig. 2). When sub-
jects describe a succession of events, words referring to E occur at epi-
sode boundaries, i.e., in the beginning or in the end of event (Bamberg, 
1997). These boundaries coincide with the deployment of transitional 
processes. Thus, description of one’s own emotional state is included in 
planning of actions. In line with this suggestion, Cacioppo and Gardner 
(Cacioppo, Gardner, 1999) suggest that the ability to monitor one’s own 
emotions is as important a determinant of life successes as traditional 
measures of intelligence.
Above,  we  have  analyzed  explanatory  capabilities  of  our  united 
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9. From emotion to consciousness and back
In the process of ontogeny and phylogeny, as well as during the behav-
ioral acts, the systemic structure of behavior changes. In the following, we 
discuss how this is reflected in the E- and C-characteristics of behavior.
Learning starts when an organism has no appropriate knowledge in 
memory to solve a new problem and can classify the situation only glob-
ally as good or bad. Approach or withdrawal should be realized but they 
cannot involve appropriate more differentiated systems. In such a situ-
ation, the old/new ratio and hence the intensity of E is increased. Two 
ways of experience reorganization may take place: a ‘‘routine’’ change 
by assimilating a new event in the frame of existing memory scheme 
(due to the reorganization of relations among its elements) and a ‘‘heu-
ristic’’ act of creating a new memory and reorganization of preexisting 
schemes (Piaget, 1951; Polanyi, 1958). The less we know about the situ-
ation, the higher the weight of older systems and thus the greater the in-
tensity of E. In addition, there is a higher probability that reorganization 
of relations between preexisting elements of individual experience is not 
enough for the solving of the problem especially in the latter case. The 
systemo-genesis, i.e., formation of new element of SE, should begin.
Cahill and McGaugh (Cahill, McGaugh, 1998) have shown that the 
more emotional a learning condition is, the stronger that long-term 
memory develops. However, we suggest that intensity of E is not a cause 
of the memory formation. Rather, intensive E is a characteristic of sys-
temic structure inherent to such a relation between available experience 
and challenge of a problem that demands the formation of new system.
In the process of learning, the number of new systems grows, and, 
consequently, the degree of differentiation of environment–individual re-
lations increases. Schouela et al. (Schouela, Steinberg, et al., 1980) argue 
that learning how to behave in a new environment means a change from 
the rough global to the more detailed behavioral forms. They conclude that 
this demonstrates the orthogenetic principle: development proceeds from 
a state of relative lack of differentiation to increasing differentiation, with 
the older and later evolved forms coexisting (Werner, Kaplan, 1956).
Bechara et al. (1997) demonstrated transition from the former to 
the later stage of learning. In a gambling task, subjects began to behave 
advantageously before they consciously realized their strategy. They also 
generated an anticipatory skin conductance response when they made 
cerebral blood flow in males during orgasm. They found a decrease of 
blood flow in all cortical areas except in prefrontal cortex where blood 
flow increased. Neurons specialized in relation to highly differentiated 
systems are abundant in cortical areas (Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grechenko, 
Gavrilov, et al., 2000). Interestingly, activity was increased only in pre-
frontal cortex. This area, as we already mentioned, may be specifically 
involved in the estimation of ‘‘emotionality’’ of the situation in terms 
of World III. The same area becomes active after acute administration 
of alcohol inducing euphoria (Tiihonen, Kuikka, Hakola, et al., 1994). 
Panksepp and Panksepp (2000) summarize data showing that when hu-
mans have intensive emotions, cortical regions tend to be silent. On the 
other hand, removal of neocortex in rats leads to increased emotionality 
(Panksepp, 1994a).
The relative weights of the two sets of systems change during com-
plex behavior. Intensity of E changes accordingly. The closer an indi-
vidual is to the final result of complex behavior, the higher is the old/
new ratio. In instrumental behavior (Fig. 3), this ratio increases in the 
final act of the behavioral sequence (taking of food) if compared to the 
preceding act–pedal pressing. During both acts, units belonging to new 
as well as to old systems are active, but during the final act, more old 
units and less new units are active. During the preceding act, pedal 
pressing, the reverse is true (Alexandrov, Yu.I., 1989; Alexandrov, Yu.I., 
Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1990; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Lauk-
ka, et al., 1991; Alexandrov, Yu.I., Grinchenko, Laukka, et al., 1993; Gor-
kin, Shevchenko, 1996). We predict that if the ratio of old/new systems 
increases during progression of complex sequential behavior, intensity 
of E increases in parallel. Striving for goal-object may be assessed as a 
peculiar indicator of E. Striving increases as the animal approaches the 
goal (Fraisse, Piaget, 1963).
Other factors influencing intensity of E include: (1) the ratio of sys-
tems belonging to the certain emotional valence and ‘‘common’’ systems 
elements which may be active in during E+ and E–. This could be de-
scribed as a degree of homogeneity of E. (2) The strength of actualiza-
tion of old systems. Thus, the longer the time from receiving nutritional 
substances, the stronger is neural activation in subcortical structures 
and the strive to obtain these substances (Kendrick, Baldwin, 1989; 
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based on earlier emerging modalities is more emotional than that based 
on later ones. This is also reflected in different languages, since a lan-
guage is used to describe the relation of individual and environment 
in terms of culture. Indeed, in many languages (e.g., English, Japanese 
and Zulu), two thirds to three quarters of words describing sensory im-
pressions refer to vision and hearing, and the remaining minority to all 
other senses (Wilson, 1998). The same tendency is observed for Russian 
(Alexandrov, Yu.I., Kolbeneva M.G., unpublished data).
Richardson and Zucco (1989) have suggested that there is a weak 
connection between olfactory experience and language. Herz and Cup-
chik (1992) found that memories associated to odors do not require 
words to be elicited. If the low level of differentiation of odor-related 
memory systems is related to their ‘‘age’’, this memory should be older 
than others. Indeed, odor-related memories appear to belong to the old-
est ones (Herz, Cupchik, 1992).
Mature organisms normally use multisensory information. So  me-
times, especially in experimental conditions, a single modality may be 
critical to achieve an adaptive result. The more prominent role of olfac-
tion in eliciting emotional memories, in comparison to vision and audi-
tion, has been demonstrated in many experiments ((Herz, 1998; Herz, 
Cupchik, 1992; 1995; Hinton, Henley, 1993), but see (Alaoui-Isma¨ıli, 
Vernet-Maury, et al., 1997)). Royet et al. (2000) suggest that odorants’ 
strong ability to induce emotional states is related to the superior po-
tency of olfaction over vision and audition in activating the amygdala. 
This does not mean that visually-guided behavior is always less emo-
tional than olfactory-guided behavior but only that the relative weight 
of old systems in the latter case is often higher than in the former one.
Werner and Kaplan (1956) analyzed phylogeny using the ortho-
genetic principle mentioned above. Phylogenetic development may be 
considered as increasing the maximal differentiation of systems in a 
given species. As a result, humans have much more choices than other 
species (Panksepp, 1994b). Also, von Uexkull (1957) suggested that dur-
ing evolution organisms can perform an increasing number of acts and 
their world becomes more discrete.
We have a general principle: as one moves from the old low-differen-
tiated systems to the newer more differentiated ones, one moves ‘‘from 
emotion to consciousness’’. In this sense, ontogeny recapitulates phy-
logeny, learning recapitulates ontogeny and act execution recapitulates 
a choice that turned out to be risky. This finding means, in our terms, 
that the global, low-differentiated ‘‘E stage’’ changed to more discrete 
C stage (creation of newest system together with conscious report or 
self-report). Similar results were earlier obtained by Tikhomirov (Tik-
homirov, 1975), who suggested a stage of Femotional presolution that 
preceded the conscious solution of a task.
Regularity similar to that occurring during learning, a shift from 
rough global to more detailed forms, may also occur in the execution of 
a definitive behavioral act. McCauley et al. (1980) asked their subjects to 
label target pictures preceded by either semantically related or unrelated 
prime pictures. Their data show that perceptual recognition may be de-
scribed as a progression starting from a quick stage of semantic process-
ing, the result of which is ‘‘tacit’’ general knowledge of the meaning of 
the stimulus. This is followed by a second stage that includes conversion 
of tacit to ‘‘explicit’’ knowledge that underlies conscious identification: 
the picture is named. Thus, the deployment of the behavioral act moves 
from general to specific (McCauley, Parmelee, et al., 1980).
Some molecular-genetic and morphological processes underlying 
learning and memory consolidation recapitulate processes used during 
ontogeny (Anokhin, K.V., 2000; Singer, 1995). We suggest another im-
portant aspect related to the similarity between the two. In both cases, 
processes start from the most global (older) systems and end with the 
creation of differentiated (newer) ones.
We already discussed studies showing that ontogenetic develop-
ment is directed from global to discrete forms. If it is so, and if the old/
new systems ratio is an important factor influencing intensity of E, we 
anticipate that the early ontogenetic stage is more emotional than the 
older one because acquiring new systems in the course of individual de-
velopment means that the old/new systems ratio increases progressively. 
Obviously, infantile behavior is less conscious (Zelazo, 2004) and more 
emotional (O’Regan, NoeЁ, 2001), and the younger a child is, the more 
emotional it is (Fraisse, Piaget, 1963; Panksepp, 1994b).
There is an order of maturation of behaviors based on the use of 
different sensory modalities. Behavior based on chemical senses be-
longs to the oldest ones, audition appears later and visual sense is the 
most recent one (Gottlieb, 1971). We assume that appearance of a new 
modality, i.e., the possibility to create new more differentiated systems, 
increases the C-characteristic of individual behavior. Thus, behavior 174 Yuri I. Alexandrov, Mikko E. Sams Emotion and Consciousness: Ends of a Continuum 175
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learning. Certainly, the time scales of phylo-, ontogenetical and learning 
processes are different. They range from centuries, years and months to 
hours and minutes.
We demonstrated in the previous section that alcohol consump-
tion increases the relative weight of less differentiated, older systems. 
If we consider development as a way from low to high differentiation, 
alcohol in healthy individuals reverses this. Such transient modification 
of individual’s experience structure, determined by suppression of the 
most differentiated systems, is characterized by the increased emotion-
ality and a growing number of behavioral mistakes. An individual’s rela-
tion with environment becomes less discrete and easier. This could be 
one of the reasons why people drink alcohol. It also is a reason why 
alcohol intoxication increases errors in performance. In alcoholics, the 
acute administration of alcohol causes the opposite effect: the number 
of active neurons belonging to new systems increases and the weight of 
highly differentiated systems increases. It is paralleled by the decrease of 
E– and increase in the effectiveness of performance (see in (Alexandrov, 
Yu.I., Grinchenko, Bodunov, et al., 2000)). Thus, in alcoholics, alcohol 
administration is associated with a shift from E to C.
10. Conclusion
We have presented a theoretical framework to aid in understand-
ing of the concepts of emotion and consciousness in terms of systemic 
structure of behavior. This framework allows bridging objective and 
subjective descriptions of emotions and consciousness. We argue that 
emotion and consciousness should not be regarded as separate psycho-
logical processes with distinct neurophysiological mechanisms. Both 
characterize similar functions in goal-directed behavior, but with differ-
ent aspects and at different levels. Therefore, behavior is simultaneously 
emotional and conscious. What differs is the relative amount of these 
two characteristics, connected to developmentally older and newer sys-
tems composing the behavioral act.
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